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The Immunity of Local Governments Under
Subchapter C: A Roadmap to an Understanding
I. INTRODUCTION
The reasons of policy given in support of any particular immunity are apt to
be grounded in the values and perceptions of the times, and with the change
in the values and perceptions, the immunity itself is likely to undergo
change as well.
William Prosser'
The Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act2 has been a feature of
Pennsylvania law for ten years, its original form having been ap-
proved by Governor Milton Shapp on November 26, 1978.' Drafted
in response to repeated attacks upon the doctrine of governmental
immunity by the courts of the Commonwealth,' and promulgated
following the judicial abrogation of that doctrine,5 the statute was
intended to restore the immunity of local government units to the
extent it existed prior to the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Education.6 Commenta-
1. PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 1032 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PRossER &
KEETON].
2. 1978 Pa. Laws at 1399, repealed by Act of 1980 Pa. Laws at 693, No. 142, § 333
(codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8541-64 (Purdon 1981)) [hereinafter Subchapter C].
3. 1978 Pa. Laws at 1410.
4. Aman, Practicing Under the New Pennsylvania Municipal Tort Claims Act, 50 PA.
B.A.Q. 122-24 (1979) [hereinafter Aman].
5. Id. at 122.
6. 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973). Ayala involved a claim of negligent supervision
arising from injuries sustained by the plaintiff in an upholstery class. Noting that "the doc-
trine of stare decisis is not a vehicle for perpetuating error," id. at 606, 305 A.2d at 888, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court abrogated the judicially created concept of governmental
immunity.
Commenting upon the proposed Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, State Representa-
517
Duquesne Law Review
tors viewed the law as a comprehensive attempt to codify the im-
munity for the protection of injured parties as well as governing
bodies,7 and with the exception of changes made in 1980 and 1982,
its primary provisions have remained unaltered by the legislature.'
Immunity, however, is not a static concept, and as the policies
that support and define its scope shift with the values and percep-
tions of the time a tension arises between it and the statutory lan-
guage designed to resist the tides of change. The purpose of this
work is to review Pennsylvania's legislatively decreed local govern-
ment immunity and provide a guide to its operations and pitfalls.
II. THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT
Prior to the institution of a lawsuit against a local government
agency, consideration must be given to the prerequisites imposed
by Pennsylvania law. Among these is the notice requirement,"
which is designed to provide the governmental unit with the op-
portunity to make timely investigation so that it may protect itself
against stale and fraudulent claims. 0 Pursuant to section 5522, a
government unit must be informed of the pending claims within
six months of the date of injury or accrual of the cause of action."1
Written notice is to be filed in the office of the local agency by or
on behalf of the persons asserting the claim and is to contain: 1)
the name and address of the person to whom the cause of action
has accrued; 2) the name and address of the person injured; 3) the
date and hour of the accident; 4) the approximate location of the
accident; and 5) the name and address of the attending
physician. 2
tive Berson stated: "The effect of this bill, if adopted would be to restore the law largely to
the state that it was in prior to the Supreme Court's decision in the Ayala case . Com-
ments of Representative Berson, 1978 PA. LEGIS. J. 3856.
7. See Comment, The Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act: Pennsylvania's Re-
sponse to the Problems of Municipal Tort Liability, 84 DICK. L. REV. 717, 718 (1980) [here-
inafter Pennsylvania's Response]. See also Aman, supra note 4, at 122.
8. The codification in 1980 that produced Subchapter C resulted in definitional
changes, most notably the abandonment of the term "political subdivision." Compare 1978
Pa. Laws 1399, No. 330, § 102 with 1980 Pa. Laws 693, No. 142, § 8501. In 1982, P.L. 693,
No. 142, § 8542(b)(6) was amended to impose liability upon a local government agency, in
limited situations, for injuries resulting from dangerous conditions of roads under Common-
wealth jurisdiction. See 1982 P.L. 452, No. 132, § 1.
9. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5522 (Purdon 1981).
10. Zack v. Saxonburg Borough, 386 Pa. 463, 469, 126 A.2d 753, 756 (1956). See gener-
ally 21 STANDARD PA. PRAC. 2d § 114:54 (1984).
11. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5522(a)(1) (Purdon 1981).
12. Id.
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The notice requirement has been judicially recognized as consti-
tutional.1 3 However, it is clear that it is not highly favored by the
courts and may not be construed in such a manner as to impair the
rights and liabilities of the parties or alter the applicable legal
principles."' Despite this fact, a suit may nonetheless be dismissed
as a result of a failure to comply with section 5522.5 Used in this
manner, the requirement operates as an affirmative defense to the
claim against the government unit."6 The defense will, however, be
unavailing if the plaintiff establishes a "reasonable excuse" for the
failure to give the requisite notice 7 and the governing body is una-
ble to establish "undue hardship" as a result of the lack of notice.' 8
Although the period for providing notice is generally fixed at six
months, it may be extended as a result of the facts of the particu-
13. Eisenhauer v. Cleveland Township, 154 Pa. Super. 206, 35 A.2d 570 (1944). The
superior court excused the plaintiff's failure to comply with the notice requirements embod-
ied in a prior law (Act of July 1, 1937, P.L. 2547, No. 476, sec. 1) and disposed of the
constitutional challenges with the simple statement: "We do not sustain any of the constitu-
tional objections . . . urged upon us .. " Id. at 215, 35 A.2d at 574. The case does not
disclose the nature of the alleged constitutional violations.
14. See Zack v. Saxonburg Borough, 386 Pa. 463, 126 A.2d 753 (1956); Landis v. City
of Philadelphia, 245 Pa. Super. 514, 369 A.2d 746 (1976); Lutz v. Scranton, 140 Pa. Super.
139, 13 A.2d 121 (1940).
15. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5522(a)(2) (Purdon 1981). This section provides:
If the statement provided for by this subsection is not filed, any civil action or pro-
ceeding commenced against the government unit more than six months after the date
of the injury shall be dismissed and the person to whom any such cause of action
accrued for any personal injury shall be forever barred from proceeding further
thereon within this Commonwealth or elsewhere. The court shall excuse non-compli-
ance with this requirement upon a showing of reasonable excuse for failure to file
such statement.
Id.
16. See Yurechko v. Allegheny County, 430 Pa. 325, 332, 243 A.2d 372, 377 (1968). As
an affirmative defense, the failure to file the proper notice must be raised as new matter
pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1030. It is improper to assert a failure to
comply with § 5522 in a preliminary objection. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1017(b); 21 STANDARD PA.
PRAC. 2d § 114:56 (1984).
17. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5522(a)(2) (Purdon 1981). It has been held that a reason-
able excuse exists when there is ignorance of the law or negligence of counsel in filing the
notice. See Yurechko, 430 Pa. at 333, 243 A.2d at 377. Additionally, difficulty in determin-
ing causation despite reasonable diligence may also excuse noncompliance. See Irrera v.
Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 231 Pa. Super. 508, 520, 331 A.2d 705, 710-11 (1974) (de-
cided under a similarly worded predecessor to the current statute).
18. Yurechko, 430 Pa. at 333, 243 A.2d at 377. The court in Yurechko stated that
undue hardship is shown when: "[Als a result of [the claimant's] tardiness, the municipality
has been unduly pressed to delve into the circumstances of the case and is unable to dis-
cover properly the events and conditions which led to the mishap. ... Id. A claimant
must, however, assert the existence of reasonable excuse for noncompliance with § 5522
before the government unit will be required to show undue hardship. See Graffigna v. City
of Philadelphia, 98 Pa. Commw. 624, 629, 512 A.2d 91, 93-94 (1986).
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lar case. When an individual is incapacitated or dies, special rules
may operate to extend the period in which notice must be given."'
Similarly, a failure to provide the proper statement may be ex-
cused if it is shown that the governmental unit involved had actual
or constructive notice of the incident or condition giving rise to the
claim.20 However, these exceptions apply only in the event that the
suit is brought against a government agency other than the
Commonwealth.1
The wording of section 5522 is also capable of an interpretation
that may extend the period in which notice can be given or render
the requirement inapplicable. Since the act speaks in terms of
when "any injury was sustained or any cause of action accrued,"22
the presence of fraud, concealment, or difficulty in ascertaining the
cause of the harm may produce a situation in which notice is given
within the prescribed period despite the passage of more than six
months from the time of the injury.2 3 It has also been held that
joinder of a governmental unit as an additional defendant for pur-
poses of asserting a claim for contribution or indemnity may alter
19. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5522(a)(3) (Purdon 1983). Subdivision (a)(3) provides in
relevant part:
In the case of a civil action or proceeding against a government unit other than the
Commonwealth government:
(i) The time for giving such written notice does not include the time during which an
individual injured is unable, due to incapacitation or disability from the injury, to
give notice, not exceeding 90 days of incapacity.
(ii) If the injuries to an individual result in death, the time for giving notice shall
commence with such death.
Id.
20. Id. at § 5522 (a)(3)(iii). Reliance upon notice, whether actual or constructive, is
misplaced, however, in the absence of proof that such notice was received by the govern-
ment unit sought to be charged. See Irrera, 231 Pa. Super. at 517, 331 A.2d at 709; Graf-
figna, 98 Pa. Commw. at 629-30, 512 A.2d at 93-94. Although notice to one government
agency may not be effective against another, notice to the insurance carrier of a local unit is
sufficient to bind the agency. See Badger v. Upper Darby Township, 348 Pa. 551, 554-55, 36
A.2d 507, 508-09 (1944). The essential ingredient appears to be identity of interests. Id.
21. See supra note 19.
22. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5522(a)(1) (Purdon 1981).
23. Irrera, 231 Pa. Super. at 520, 331 A.2d at 710. Construing a similarly worded pred-
ecessor to § 5522, the court stated:
[T]ime begins to run on the date of the injury unless, because of fraud or conceal-
ment by the [government unit], or in spite of reasonable diligence by the claimant,
knowledge of the negligence or its causes cannot be discovered until after the six
month period. This does not mean that the claimant's duty of inquiry will be excused
by mere mistake, misunderstanding, or actual lack of knowledge. If a party has the
means of discovery within his power but neglects to use them, his claim will still be
barred.
Id. at 710-11 (citations omitted).
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the rules relating to providing notice.24 The language making sec-
tion 5522 applicable to a person seeking to recover for injuries to
"his person" 25 has prompted one court to hold that it excludes ac-
tions for wrongful death and survival from the requirement of
notice.2 6
The notice requirement of section 5522 seldom becomes an in-
surmountable hurdle in the prosecution of an action against a local
government agency. However, it retains that potential despite its
many exceptions. At the very least, noncompliance frequently re-
sults in the expenditure of time and effort in pretrial proceedings
that could have been easily avoided. In an area of the law filled
with substantial obstacles to the maintenance of a suit, the failure
to provide the required notice is but a technicality. It is, nonethe-
less, a technicality of which the careful practitioner should always
be mindful.
III. STATING A CLAIM UNDER SUBCHAPTER C
The statutory scheme of immunity embodied in Subchapter C
imposes three requirements that must be satisfied before a suit
may be maintained against a local agency. 27 Pursuant to section
24. See, e.g., Roberts v. Karota, 15 D. & C.3d 685 (1981), wherein the court upheld
joinder of the Commonwealth on the grounds that "[t]he cause of action accrues at the time
plaintiff's complaint is reduced to judgment with regard to indemnity, and defendant here
prudently joined the Commonwealth prior to this." Id. at 689. Cf. Mummert v. Besic, 15 D.
& C. 2d 752 (1958). The court in Mummert found the notice requirement inapplicable since
the assertion of a right to contribution by the original defendant did not constitute a claim
for "damages" within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 760.
25. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5522(a)(1) (Purdon 1981)(emphasis added).
26. See Domanski v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 53 D. & C. 2d 686 (1972). Con-
struing a similarly worded predecessor to § 5522, the court stated:
The notice requirement ... quite clearly and in unequivocal language speaks only to
a person about to commence an action for injury to his person. In this case the dece-
dent was that person. Neither his widow nor personal representative have any injury
to their persons, and furthermore are not mentioned in the act.
Id. at 688 (emphasis in original).
27. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8542(a) (Purdon 1981). Section 8542 provides:
LiAanLrry IMPOSED-- A local agency shall be liable for damages on account of an in-
jury to a person or property within the limits set forth in this subchapter if both of
the following conditions are satisfied and the injury occurs as a result of one of the
acts set forth in subsection (b):
(1) The damages would be recoverable under common law or a statute creating a
cause of action if the injury were caused by a person not having available a defense
under section 8541 (relating to governmental immunity) or section 8546 (relating to
official immunity); and
(2) The injury was caused by the negligent acts of the local agency or an employee
thereof acting within the scope of his office or duties with respect to one of the cate-
gories listed in subsection (b). As used in this paragraph, "negligent acts" shall not
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8542, a claimant must show: 1) that his injuries were the result of
the negligent conduct of an agency or its employees acting within
the scope of their duties; 2) that an action would exist at common
law or by statutory creation if the alleged tortfeasor did not have
official or governmental status; and 3) that the act complained of
falls within any of the eight enumerated exceptions to the
immunity.2"
The two primary concepts which appear throughout the excep-
tions listed in section 8542(b) are "dangerous condition" and "care,
custody or control."29 Despite their pivotal nature, these terms are
not legislatively defined and have not been the focus of a great
deal of judicial interpretation. 0 Recent developments have, how-
ever, cast uncertainty upon their meaning and threaten to disrupt
the efficient operation of Subchapter C.
A. Mascaro and "Care, Custody or Control"
In the case of Mascaro v. Youth Study Center,"1 the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court construed the phrase "care, custody or control"
and marked what could be the end of the "ordinary meaning" ap-
proach to interpreting the key terms of Subchapter C. Relying
include acts or conduct which constitutes a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or will-
ful misconduct.
Id.
28. Id. See also Pennsylvania's Response, supra note 7, at 732-33; Mascaro v. Youth
Study Center, 514 Pa. 351, 355-61, 523 A.2d 1118, 1120-23 (1987). The eight exceptions to
governmental immunity include: the operation of motor vehicles; the care, custody or con-
trol of personal property, real property, and animals; and injuries resulting from dangerous
conditions of trees, traffic controls, streetlighting, utility service facilities, streets and side-
walks. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8542(b) (Purdon 1981).
29. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8542(b) (Purdon 1981). The term "dangerous condi-
tion" is found in subsections four, five, six, and seven. "Care, custody or control" appears in
subsections two, three, four and eight. Id.
30. The courts of the Commonwealth appear to have adopted a common usage ap-
proach to construing the terms "dangerous condition" and "care, custody or control." See,
e.g., Mistecka v. Commonwealth, 46 Pa. Commw. 267, 273, 408 A.2d 159, 162 (1972); Evans
v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 Pa. Commw. 626, 629, 492 A.2d 1209, 1211 (1985).
One author has noted that: "The phrase 'care, custody or control' ... suggests ... that
the provision was intended to encompass all activities associated with [the particular sub-
ject] . . . . 'Dangerous condition' implies physical attributes of property much more readily
than does the language 'care, custody or control.'" Pennsylvania's Response, supra note 7,
at 745 (emphasis added). But see Gratkie v. Air Wisconsin, Inc., 107 Pa. Commw. 461, 468,
528 A.2d 1032, 1035 (1987).
31. 514 Pa. 351, 523 A.2d 1118 (1987). Mascaro involved a claim under the real prop-
erty exception to immunity, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8542(b)(3) (Purdon 1981), arising
from injuries inflicted upon the plaintiffs by an escapee from a juvenile detention facility.
The plaintiffs alleged that the city and the Center were negligent in maintaining the deten-
tion facilities. 514 Pa. at 353-54, 523 A.2d at 1119.
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upon a litany of cases holding the real property exception to im-
munity inapplicable to claims of negligent supervision of school
students, the court stated that the "care, custody or control" of
real estate is implicated only where it is alleged that an "artificial
condition or defect of the land itself causes the injury. '3 2 Aside
from considerably narrowing the previously assumed meaning of
the phrase, the case has generated grave doubts as to the contin-
ued validity of the common meaning ascribed to "dangerous
condition.
33
The initial premise of the Mascaro court was that given the leg-
islative intent to protect governmental units from liability, the ex-
ceptions to immunity must be narrowly construed. " Although
clearly correct in this regard,35 the court overlooked legislative au-
thority which indicates that the exceptions should be construed
"according to their common and approved usage." 3 Since a spe-
cialized meaning for the term "care, custody or control" had not
previously existed, the latter rule of construction should certainly
be given some consideration in interpreting the exceptions con-
32. Id. at 363, 523 A.2d at 1124.
33. Mistecka, supra note 30, had construed "condition" in accordance with its ordi-
nary meaning of "a state of affairs that hampers or impedes or requires correction" and left
the determination of "dangerousness" for the jury. Mistecka, 46 Pa. Commw. at 273, 408
A.2d at 162. Although not overruled, the case has been severely criticized in the wake of
Mascaro. See Rippey v. Fogel, 108 Pa. Commw. 296, 299-300 n.1, 529 A.2d 608, 610 n.1
(1987); Gratkie v. Air Wisconsin, Inc., 107 Pa. Commw. 461, 528 A.2d 1032 (1987); Gallagher
v. Commonwealth Bureau of Corrections, - Pa. Commw. -, 545 A.2d 981, 983
(1988).
34. Mascaro, 514 Pa. at 361, 523 A.2d at 1123.
35. See Aman, supra note 4, at 123.
As finally enacted, however, the Act follows ... those in the majority of other states
by taking a "closed-end" approach. This involves a general provision prohibiting lia-
bility except in specified categories of cases. . . . The "closed-end" form is more
favorable to the local governments (and their taxpayers), in placing upon the plaintiff
the risk of any omissions (inadvertent or otherwise) from the list of categories of
cases.
Id. See also Pennsylvania's Response, supra note 7, at 737. But cf. Mascaro, 514 Pa. at 369-
71, 523 A.2d at 1127-28 (Larsen, J., dissenting) (expressing the view that the exceptions
should be read broadly to limit the damage to provisions of the state constitution he be-
lieves Subchapter C violates).
36. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1903 (Purdon Supp. 1988). Section 1903 provides in rele-
vant part:
(a) Words and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and accord-
ing to their common and approved usage; but technical words and phrases and such
others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning or are defined in this
part, shall be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or
definition.
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tained in section 8542(b).
Applying the common and approved usage approach, it is appar-
ent that the phrase "care, custody or control" includes activities
relating to maintenance, restraint and supervision. The Mascaro
court's analysis in support of a narrow construction arguably elimi-
nates the possibility of liability arising from such acts and would
cloak local agencies with protective immunity in many instances in
which they would traditionally be held subject to suit.3 7 Addition-
ally, a uniform application of the Mascaro analysis throughout the
text of section 8542(b) would create confusion and redundancy in
the law. 8
A preferable interpretation of the phrase would extend liability
to those activities which could be said to constitute maintenance,
restraint or supervision. A narrow construction would be achieved
by restricting the scope of the exceptions to items properly within
the specified subject matter. This approach would preserve the
traditional availability of legal redress for injuries sustained by pri-
vate individuals and would not be inconsistent with the case law
cited by the court in Mascaro.9 By applying the common usage of
the words "care, custody or control" and "dangerous condition,"
but stringently adhering to the dictates of the nexus requirement
37. Potentially removed from the range of acts which may impose liability are those
situations where government employees act negligently to repair or maintain an item and
cause personal injury or property damage. A strict application of the Mascaro rule would
result in a dismissal of such suits on the basis of governmental immunity since the injury
arises from the negligent acts of the employees rather than the condition of the particular
item for which they were caring. This, despite the fact that Pennsylvania has, for well over
100 years, recognized the fact that a governing body may be liable for negligent trespass on
the theory that: "Where any person has a right to demand the exercise of a public function,
and there is an officer or set of officers authorized to exercise that function, there the right
and authority give rise to the duty." Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. 324, 330 (1860).
38. The Mascaro interpretation would make no sense in § 8542(b)(4) which provides
that a local agency will be liable for dangerous conditions of trees, traffic signs and other
traffic controls in its "care, custody or control." See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8542(b)(4)
(Purdon 1981). Additionally, it would lead to the outrageous result that a local agency would
be liable for injuries resulting from "an artificial condition or defect" of an animal itself. Id.
at § 8542(b)(8). Finally, as interpreted by the supreme court, there would appear to be very
little, if any, difference between "care, custody or control" and what has generally been
understood as a "dangerous condition." See supra note 30.
39. See 514 Pa. at 362-63, 523 A.2d at 1124. The cases cited by the majority are essen-
tially claims for injuries resulting from the negligent supervision of school students while on
governmentally owned real estate. Since such allegations are unrelated to the "care, custody
or control" of real property, but rather the "care, custody or control" of third parties, these
cases are not within the reach of the real property exception, having failed the nexus re-
quirement found in § 8542(a). See supra note 27; see also Mascaro, 514 Pa. at 360-61, 523
A.2d at 1123.
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of section 8542(a)(2), the statutory exceptions can be narrowed
while the historical spheres of liability are preserved.
The problem in Mascaro arises from the majority's decision that
the nexus requirement had been met since the failure to ade-
quately maintain the detention facility was a cause in fact of the
injuries sustained. 0 At this point, the court, despite its desire for a
narrow interpretation, actually broadened the exceptions to gov-
ernmental immunity by holding that even claims of negligent su-
pervision of third parties will suffice to state a claim under Sub-
chapter C if the "but for" test of causation can establish a nexus
between the injury sustained and the subject matter of a particular
exception.4
In an effort to close this opening, the court called upon the con-
cept of legal causation and the provisions of section 8541.2 The
critical distinction is that reliance upon these items transformed
the issue from an interpretation of the proper scope of the phrase
"care, custody or control" to an examination of what effect the ac-
tions of a third party will have upon the liability of a government
unit.43 The failure of the courts of the Commonwealth to clearly
differentiate between these issues has produced interpretive and
conceptual difficulties in the operation of Subchapter C.
B. Criminal and Negligent Acts of Third Parties
In an attempt to remain true to its primary premise, the court
in Mascaro sought to narrow its interpretation of the real property
exception. The vehicle chosen for this task was the general immu-
40. Mascaro, 514 Pa. at 360-61, 523 A.2d at 1123. As the court stated: "[W]hen the
Appellees alleged that the negligent repair of the Center was a cause of injuries to them,
they were not incorrect. The negligence of the City and Center was a condition necessary for
their injury in the "but for" sense and satisfies the statutory requirement." Id.
41. Id. The court acknowledged that: "Although it might be argued that [the juvenile
detainee] was able to escape, not because of the negligent maintenance of the detention
facility, but rather, because he was insufficiently guarded, in either event, the negligence of
the local agency is implicated." Id.
42. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8541 (Purdon 1981). See infra note 45.
43. At this juncture, it would appear that the Mascaro court's statement that the al-
leged injury be caused by a defect of the land itself, 514 Pa. at 363, 523 A.2d at 1124,
constitutes little more than dicta. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's adoption of
the passage in a subsequent case involving a criminal assault on a subway platform, see
Chevalier v. City of Philadelphia, 516 Pa. 316, 532 A.2d 411 (1987), leaves the reach of the
statement uncertain. The better approach appears to be to treat the issues of the scope of
the particular exception to the immunity and the effect of third party actions as separate,
despite the fact that case law since Mascaro has not drawn such a distinction.
44. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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nity provision of Subchapter C, which shields a local agency from
liability for any acts of the agency, its employees, "or any other
person" except as otherwise provided." The court reasoned that
since the enumerated exceptions to governmental immunity make
no express reference to the acts of third parties, the legislature had
properly precluded the imposition of liability in such instances."
This, the court stated, was "consistent with the general rule that
the criminal and negligent acts of third parties are superceding
causes which absolve the original actor .. .from liability for the
harm caused by such third parties.
'4 7
Although correct in as far as it goes, the court's rationale fails to
consider the provisions of section 8542(a)(1) which require the
claim asserted against a local agency to be one for which damages
would be recoverable at common law if asserted against a party not
having a Subchapter C defense available.4" Through this mecha-
nism, consideration of third party acts surreptitiously creeps
within the requirements that must be met in order to establish a
claim against a local government unit. Clearly, in those situations
where the general rule applies and the criminal or negligent acts of
a third party constitute a superceding cause of injury, damages
would not be recoverable from the original actor at common law.
Therefore, a person asserting such a claim against a local agency
would be barred by the failure to satisfy the dictates of section
8542(a)(1).
However, when the acts of the third party are not such as to
come within the general rule because they are reasonably foresee-
able consequences of the original actor's negligence, 49 a suit against
a local agency should proceed as it does against a private party
defendant. Such situations fall within the clause "except as other-
wise provided" found in section 8541. This approach would tend to
enhance uniformity and lessen confusion by maintaining standards
of care for government units and private individuals which con-
45. Mascaro, 514 Pa. at 363-64, 523 A.2d at 1124 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
8541 (Purdon 1981)). Section 8541 states: "Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter,
no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or
property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person."
Id.
46. Mascaro, 514 Pa. at 363-64, 523 A.2d at 1124.
47. Id.
48. See supra note 27.
49. See, e.g., Drew v. Laber, 477 Pa. 297, 383 A.2d 941 (1978); Grainy v. Campbell, 493
Pa. 88, 425 A.2d 379 (1981); Ford v. Jeffries, 474 Pa. 588, 379 A.2d 111 (1977); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 447-48 (1979).
Vol. 27:517
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form to the general desire to keep the liability of such parties
somewhat coextensive.5"
C. The "Special Duty" Rule
Although it is more consistent with the statutory structure of
Subchapter C to subject governmental units to liability for third
party acts in some instances, there is substance to the Mascaro
court's view that it would be "incongruous" to do so.51 This is es-
pecially true when viewed in light of the potentially inundating
flood of litigation that could be generated. There is available, how-
ever, a satisfactory regulating device that is conceptually consistent
with Subchapter C and better suited to the purposes of the Act
than is the Mascaro court's blind prohibition of such suits.5 2 This
device is the "special duty" rule.
Prior to the judicial abrogation of the governmental immunities,
the quantity of municipal tort suits was controlled by the distinc-
tion drawn between governmental functions and those of a propri-
etary nature. 3 With the statutory reinstatement of immunity, this
50. See Vann v. Board of Educ. of the School Dist. of Philadelphia, 76 Pa. Commw.
604, 608 n.5, 464 A.2d 684, 686 n.5 (1983). This approach, in and of itself, does not dispose
of the majority's contention that it would be "incongruous" to shield a government unit
from liability for the criminal acts of its agents, while imposing liability for the same acts
committed by non-agents. See infra note 51. Coupled with the narrow construction of the
subject matter of the immunity exceptions already proposed, the discussion of third party
acts and the special duty rule, infra, the incongruity is lessened. It should be noted that the
incongruity is a product of the express terms of § 8542(a)(2) rather than any interpretive
error. Additionally, nothing within Subchapter C indicates that third party negligence
should operate as a superceding cause in all instances.
51. Mascaro, 514 Pa. at 364, 523 A.2d at 1124. As stated in the majority's opinion:
It would be incongruous, indeed, to shield the City or the Center from liability for the
crimes of its agents and employees, but impose liability for the crimes of others. We
believe, given the legislative scheme of immunity, that the Act consistently excludes
all criminal acts from liability, including the acts of criminals . . . who take advan-
tage of the defeats in municipal property to commit their own crimes.
Id.
52. See Pennsylvania's Response, supra note 7, at 718. The Act represents Pennsylva-
nia's legislative response to the problems of imposing tort liability on local government
units. The crux of the controversy lies in the conflict between two fundamental but diver-
gent interests: the need for the unhampered and effective functioning of cities, towns, and
counties, and the equally desirable goal of redressing the injuries of the private individual.
Id.
53. See, e.g., Shields v. Pittsburgh School Dist., 408 Pa. 388, 389-90, 184 A.2d 240, 241
(1962), overruled sub silencio, Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 587 (1973).
In Pennsylvania, it has long been the rule that a school district is not liable in tres-
pass for the negligence of its officers and employees committed while engaged in a
governmental function. However, the rule is equally well established that this immu-
nity does not prevail if the negligent act is committed in the course of a private or
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distinction was abandoned in favor of a traditional duty analysis.6"
What has developed is an examination of the circumstances giving
rise to an allegation of nonfeasance against a government unit to
determine whether a "special relationship" exists between the par-
ties.6 5 Since the special duty concept is applicable to situations in
which a failure to act is alleged, it appears to have particular util-
ity in instances involving third party acts.5
There are three general requirements of a special relationship.
First, the government agency sought to be charged must have been
aware of the individual's particular situation or unique status. Sec-
ond, the agency must have had knowledge of the potential for the
particular harm which the individual has suffered. And third, the
agency must have voluntarily assumed to protect the individual
from the precise harm which occurred. 7
The appeal of the special duty rule is two-fold. First, it substan-
tially reduces the scope of potential liability in instances where a
local unit acts in a traditionally governmental manner. This largely
proprietary function. The legal demarcation between acts that are governmental and
proprietary in nature is not easily resolved. The tests frequently suggested are con-
fusing and have proven unsatisfactory in many practical respects.
Id. (citations omitted).
54. See Pennsylvania's Response, supra note 7, at 737 (citing Pa. S. No. 1477,
Printer's No. 2163, Session of 1978, § 102(b)). See also Davies v. Barnes, 94 Pa. Commw.
145, 148-49, 503 A.2d 93, 95 (1986).
55. See Melendez v. City of Philadelphia, 320 Pa. Super. 59, 64, 466 A.2d 1060, 1063
(1983). In this action, a minor sued for injuries sustained when he was shot in the eye during
a racial disturbance. The plaintiff alleged that assurances of safety made by the police cre-
ated a "special relationship" upon which liability could rest. The court held that since the
assurances had been made to a group rather than to the plaintiff individually, no "special
relationship" existed. Id. This case arose in the interim between the abrogation of govern-
mental immunity and the passage of Subchapter C. Although governmental immunity was
not an issue, similar analysis has been used under the provisions of the act. See Vann v.
Board of Educ. of the School Dist. of Philadelphia, 76 Pa. Commw. 604, 464 A.2d 684
(1983); Casey v. Geiger, 346 Pa. Super. 279, 499 A.2d 606 (1985), allocotur denied, 533 A.2d
710 (1987).
56. See supra note 50. The effect of a third party act will vary depending upon
whether the government unit has created a new risk of harm or simply failed to take precau-
tions against an existing risk of harm. See infra note 59. Actions involving third parties
frequently fall within the latter category. See, e.g., Melendez v. City of Philadelphia, 320 Pa.
Super. 59, 466 A.2d 1060 (1983).
57. Melendez, 320 Pa. Super. at 65, 466 A.2d at 1064. The court in Melendez stated:
The duty of the City. . . to provide police protection is a public one which may not
be claimed by an individual unless a special relationship exists between the City and
the individual. A special relationship is generally found to exist only in cases in which
an individual is exposed to a special danger and the authorities have undertaken the
responsibility to provide adequate protection for him.
Id. at 64, 466 A.2d at 1063 (quoting Chapman v. City of Philadelphia, 290 Pa. Super. 281,
283, 434 A.2d 753, 754 (1981)).
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eliminates the incongruity which the Mascaro court sought to pre-
vent.5 8 Secondly, the rule focuses attention upon the distinction
between nonfeasance and misfeasance in a municipal tort liability
setting.59
The operation of these factors is clarified when they are ana-
lyzed within a context. Assume a person is injured by the criminal
or negligent act of a third party that was facilitated by a condition
of land owned by a local agency.60 The resulting suit could prop-
erly be classified as one alleging nonfeasance since its portent
would be that the municipality had failed to properly maintain the
area in a manner which would have protected the injured party
from a risk not of the government unit's making. Because of the
nature of the case, a duty owing to the plaintiff would have to be
established using the special duty rule. Even if the third party act
was foreseeable and therefore not a superceding cause of the in-
jury,61 the plaintiff could not prevail unless a special duty were
established. 2
This is to be distinguished from a case alleging misfeasance on
58. See supra notes 50 and 51. Although the structure of § 8542 creates an inherent
inconsistency when the government unit's liability for the criminal acts of their agents is
compared with that of non-agents, the application of the special duty rule will substantially
limit the number of parties who could potentially bring suit. This allows Subchapter C to
operate in a controlled manner until legislative action abolishes any incongruity, while pro-
tecting the statute's key concepts from the confusion engendered through judicial
correction.
59. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at § 56, wherein it is stated:
The reason for the distinction may be said to lie in the fact that by "misfeasance" the
defendant has created a new risk of harm to the plaintiff, while by "nonfeasance" he
has at least made his situation no worse, and has merely failed to benefit him by
interfering in his affairs.
Id. at 373.
60. See, e.g., Casey v. Geiger, 346 Pa. Super. 279, 499 A.2d 606 (1985). In Casey, a
mother and daughter were assaulted and raped while walking through a municipally owned
park. Suit was brought against the borough alleging negligence in failing to provide ade-
quate police protection and failing to properly clear underbrush which facilitated the crimi-
nal act. Id. See also Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 514 Pa. 351, 523 A.2d 1118 (1987).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 44-50. Although implicit in the hypotheticals
used herein, it should be noted the governmental act forming the basis of liability must
come within one of the exceptions listed in § 8542(b).
62. Casey, 346 Pa. Super. at 294-95, 499 A.2d at 614. As the court stated:
Appellants nevertheless contend that because a prior rape had occurred some months
before the instant attack, the criminal act was not a superceding cause of appellee's
negligence, but rather its proximate result, and they cite the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 448 in support thereof. However, we find appellant's reliance on section 448
to be misplaced since that section is only relevant to the question of causation in a
negligence action and does not determine whether appellees owed a duty to the
appellant.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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the part of a government unit.?Assume a local agency purchases an
abandoned railway bed which it dedicates to public use as a recrea-
tional trail. At a later time the trail is designated a roadway for the
general use of trucks and automobiles, but it is not so marked and
the general public is not informed of the change. If a person mak-
ing recreational use of the area is struck and injured by a negli-
gently driven automobile, can the local agency be held
responsible?"3
In such a case, the government unit has acted in such a manner
as to create a new risk of harm to the plaintiff. Since the munici-
pality has chosen to act, it assumes a duty to do so in a prudent
manner.4 It is unnecessary, in such cases, to engage in a special
duty analysis6 5 The only proper question is whether the negligence
of the driver was reasonably foreseeable, or instead, a superceding
cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
Although in a great many situations the results achieved under
Mascaro and the foregoing rationale will be the same, there will be
those cases in which the latter approach will allow a recovery that
the rigid Mascaro test would bar. The essence of stating a claim
under Subchapter C is found in retaining the conceptual clarity
between the elements involved. The act forming the basis of the
complaint must satisfy to the section 8542 requirements. This
means that the conduct of the agency must be negligent, actiona-
ble against a party lacking a Subchapter C defense and have a
cause in fact relationship with an enumerated exception to
immunity.
In assessing whether the conduct would be actionable against a
party lacking a Subchapter C defense, the act should be analyzed
in terms of its nature as either misfeasant or nonfeasant. If the act
is nonfeasant the special duty rule will need to be satisfied. When
third party acts are involved, they should be examined to deter-
63. The facts are those of the case Kulesza v. Preston Township, No. 353-1987-Civil
(C.P. Wayne County, Pa. 1987), in which the court, relying on Mascaro, granted judgment
on the pleadings on behalf of the defendant township because the injuries were the result of
the negligence of a third party. Id. (decision and order granting judgment on the pleadings
June 15, 1988).
64. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, at § 56.
65. Id. at 374.
Liability for "misfeasance," then, may extend to any person to whom harm may rea-
sonably be anticipated as a result of the defendant's conduct, or perhaps even be-
yond; while for "nonfeasance" it is necessary to find some definite relation between
the parties, of such a character that social policy justifies the imposition of a duty to
act.
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mine their effect upon the claim. This analysis is consistent with
the structure of Subchapter C; however, for the reasons previously
addressed, it is inconsistent, to a certain extent with Mascaro. To
that extent, Mascaro should be reconsidered.
IV. DAMAGES
As in any other lawsuit, damages are of particular importance in
actions against government agencies. Additional consideration
should be given to the matter in such suits as a result of the statu-
torily imposed limitations upon recoverable damages."
Section 8553 of Subchapter C provides that the total damages
recoverable in an action against a local agency shall not exceed
$500,000 in the aggregate."' This amount includes recovery for the
loss of past and future earnings, pain and suffering (only in the
event of death or permanent injury with medical expenses exceed-
ing $1500), medical expenses, and loss of consortium, support, and
property." The amount of insurance benefits received as a result
of the injury incurred must be deducted from the amount of the
damages otherwise recoverable, except in cases involving death.69
Finally, prejudgment interest may not be awarded in any action
brought under Subchapter C.70
66. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8549, 8553 (Purdon 1981). The limitations have with-
held constitutional attack. See Smith v. City of Philadelphia, 512 Pa. 129, 516 A.2d 306
(1986), appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 1074 (1987).
67. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8553(b) (Purdon 1981). This section reads: "AmouNrs
RECOVERABLE- Damages arising from the same cause of action or transaction or occurrence
or series of causes of action or transactions or occurrences shall not exceed $500,000 in the
aggregate." Id. This section has been interpreted to limit the amount recoverable to
$500,000 per incident regardless of the number of plaintiffs or the extent of the injuries
sustained. See City of Philadelphia v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 92 Pa. Commw. 20, 498 A.2d 462
(1985).
68. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8553(c) (Purdon 1981).
69. Id. at § 8553(d). This section provides:
INSURANCE BENEFITS- If a claimant receives or is entitled to receive insurance bene-
fits under a policy of insurance other than a life insurance policy as a result of losses
for which damages are recoverable under subsection (c), the amount of such benefits
shall be deducted from the amount of damages which would otherwise be recoverable
by such claimant.
Id. This section has been upheld against constitutional attack. See Germantown Savings
Bank v. City of Philadelphia, 98 Pa. Commw. 508, 512 A.2d 756 (1986), aff'd, 517 Pa. 311,
535 A.2d 1052 (1988).
70. 42 P.S. § 20043 (Purdon 1982). This section does not immunize a local agency from
an award of delay damages pursuant to PA. R. Civ. P. 238. See Laudenberger v. Port Auth.
of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 66, 436 A.2d 147, 154-55 (1981); City of Pittsburgh v.
Privirotto, 93 Pa. Commw. 563, 573-75, 502 A.2d 747, 752 (1985), aff'd, 515 Pa. 246, 255, 528
A.2d 125, 130 (1987).
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Recent developments have occurred with respect to whether pu-
nitive damages are properly recoverable in actions against local
agencies. 71 Despite the existence of historical authority prohibiting
the recovery of such damages,72 the judicial abrogation of the im-
munities generally raised the issue anew.73 Although the statutory
framework of Subchapter C may provide a basis for the contention
that exemplary damages are recoverable,7 4  it appears that the
question has been firmly resolved against the imposition of such
liability on policy grounds.76 Punitive damages may, however, be
imposed upon an employee of a local agency when his actions qual-
ify as outrageous or willful. 76
V. COLLECTION OF JUDGMENTS
Subchapter C provides differing methods for the collection of
71. As to the recovery of exemplary damages against municipal corporations, see gen-
erally Annotation, Recovery of Exemplary or Punitive Damages From Municipal Corpora-
tions, 1 A.L.R. 4th 448 (1980).
72. See Order of the Hermits of St. Augustine v. County of Philadelphia, 4 Clark 120
(Pa. 1847). In this action, recovery was sought for property damaged during the course of a
riot. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, sitting nisi prius, stated: "If this action were against
rioters and not against the county, I would instruct you to give exemplary damages; these,
however, you cannot give against the county, but damages to the full extent of the injury
you should give." Id. at 123.
The exact basis of the court's statement is unclear because it sat nisi prius without ren-
dering an opinion. Its value as controlling precedent has been questioned. See Township of
Bensalem v. Press, 93 Pa. Commw. 235, 246 n.6, 501 A.2d 331, 337 n.6 (1985).
73. See Feingold v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 339 Pa. Super. 15, 30, 448 A.2d
284, 292 (1985), aff'd, 512 Pa. 567, 517 A.2d 1270 (1986).
74. Section 8542(a)(2) of Subchapter C, which lists the second requirement necessary
to establishing a claim against a local agency, speaks in terms of negligent acts and defines
such acts as excluding those which constitute "crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful
misconduct." See supra note 27. On the basis of that language and the concept of "outra-
geous conduct," see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979), it could be
argued that certain outrageous acts would justify punitive damages and not be within the
ambit of the § 8542(a)(2) prohibition of liability for willful misconduct. See, e.g., Township
of Bensalem, 93 Pa. Commw. at 249-51, 501 A.2d at 338-39, wherein the court held that a
municipality may not be held vicariously liable for punitive damages because of public pol-
icy reasons and Pennsylvania's restrictive rule of liability for outrageous conduct. Id.
75. See Feingold v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 512 Pa. 567, 517 A.2d 1270
(1986). Although based upon policy reasons rather than statutory interpretation, the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court has held that the provisions of 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8528
(Purdon 1981), which limit the damages recoverable against the Commonwealth, "does not
permit the recovery of punitive damages." Feingold, 339 Pa. Super. at 31 n.4, 488 A.2d at
293 n.4. The commonwealth court has indicated that punitive damages may not be awarded
under Subchapter C. See E-Z Parks, Inc. v. Philadelphia Parking Auth., 110 Pa. Commw.
629, 632 n.3, 532 A.2d 1272, 1275 n.3 (1987).
76. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8550 (Purdon 1981); Township of Bensalem, 93 Pa.
Commw. at 251, 501 A.2d at 339.
Government Immunity
judgments against local agencies, depending on whether the agency
is self-insured7 or procures insurance through a contract with a
carrier. 78 When a local unit maintains a contract of insurance, a
judgment may be collected in accordance with the methods pro-
vided in the agreement or as otherwise provided by law to the ex-
tent of the policy limits.1 9 When a judgment is obtained against an
under-insured or self-insured local agency, payment may be based
upon proof of the indebtedness or evidence of any estimated tax
levy that the judgment may make necessary.80 Subchapter C also
provides, as an option, that the judgment be made payable over a
period of from one to ten years."1 However, in the event that the
payment period exceeds three years, interest may be assessed at a
prescribed rate for the first three years and at a rate of six percent
each year thereafter. 2
VI. CONCLUSION
The intent of this work has been to examine the current con-
tours of governmental immunity in light of the ten years of devel-
opment under the statutorily imposed doctrine contained in Sub-
chapter C. Although the general scheme appears to be capable of
fulfilling its intended dual purpose, recent interpretations have
created areas of difficulty within the core of the Act which may
upset the consistency the legislation was intended to ensure. An
attempt has been made herein to present ways in which the com-
peting policies of protecting the government fisc and compensating
injured parties may be balanced to assure a more uniform applica-
tion of the provisions of Subchapter C. The only certainty, how-
ever, is, as Prosser notes, that as the values and perceptions sup-
porting the immunity change, so too. will the immunity.
8 3
Michael P. Lehutsky
77. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8559 (Purdon 1981).
78. Id. at § 8558.
79. Id. Section 8558 provides:
If the judgment is obtained against a local agency that has procured a contract or
policy of public liability insurance protection, the holder of the judgment may use the
methods of collecting the judgment as are provided by the policy or contract and the
laws of the Commonwealth to the extent of the limits of the coverage provided.
Id.
80. Id. at § 8559. This section also notes the trial court's discretion in requiring addi-
tional evidence to structure the payment plan. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See supra note 1.
1989 533

